D
DrRocket
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<p><BR/>Replying to:<BR/><DIV CLASS='Discussion_PostQuote'>It does seem like a long shot to me too. A manufacturing defect seems more likely to me, but that must either have been confined to the last two Soyuz or be too subtle to spot, since IIRC they've been inspecting pyrobolts from the same lot. But I suppose when you're desperate, any clue seems worth looking into.As far as the fleet being grounded, failures like this have not been common. It could be that there is a very rare condition lurking in the design that chance alone caused to happen twice in a row, confounding engineers who are naturally looking for a commonality between Soyuz TMA 10 and Soyuz TMA 11. Look at Columbia; it was taken down by something that had happened on every single flight since the beginning, yet the fleet had never been grounded. That's the nightmare of every spacecraft engineer, of course -- a latent design defect. <br />Posted by CalliArcale</DIV></p><p>Columbia should have been grounded. The rationale presented for flying despite loss of foam -- that the foam was not known to hit anything -- I will charitably call suspect. That the rationale was, unusually, presented by the main tank program manager rather than the chief engineer (as I was told by someone in the room), is more suspect. One ought not accept a condition that is other than what it was designed to be, and anyone with any appreciation for fluid dynamics ought to know that the trajectory of something like a piece of foam breaking off of the main tank in flight will not be be reproducible.</p><p>I have seen launch schedules put in jeopardy for a lot less, and for good reason. I forced replacement of a pyrotechnic component on launcher for the Cassini mission, despite the fact that it was apparently acceptable to the component engineer, and "in spec" but out-of-family. Further inspection determined that it was about to fail.</p><p>And I dont't thnk that the foam condition had existed from the very beginning. The sprayable insulation used on Columbia was a bit different from that used at the beginning of the program. The original formulation used a large amount of methylene chloride as a carrier solvent, and I believe that the new formulation is somewhat different. I have been lead to believe that it does not adhere as well.</p><p>I have been on quite a few failure investigations, and this techique of pulling a single bolt from a flight vehicle is a completely new one on me. I don't understand it from a physics point of view, I don't understand it from a statistical point of view, I don't understand it from a configuration control point of view, and I don't understand it from a manufacturing point of view. </p><p>What bothers me more is the Russian tendancy to focus on whether there is a latent design defect or whether there is a quality control issue. And if the issue is quality control to decide that the design is OK and proceed with use relying on future quality inspections to catch the defect that they missed earlier. The U.S. would drive for a "root cause" and implementation of targeted corrective action, and correction of other potential problems that might be uncovered during the investigation. Duplication of the failure in controlled tests is also typical of a U.S. approach. Of course, not always is it possible to meet this ideal. But for a small component like an explosive bolt, it ought to be quite doable, assuming that the configuration control is good and that quality records are maintained.</p><p>I would tend to doubt that there is a very rare defect lurking in the design. Design disciplines and solid analysis and qualification testing can address such issues, and explosive bolts are not all that complicated anyway. More likely there is a problem with the manufacturing process and with control of that process. Those sorts of problems can also be handled in a straightforward manner using statistical process control on the manufacturing floor.</p><p>I have seen quie a few design defects, but no latent ones. Rockets tend to be pretty unforgiving of design problems and reveal them rather quickly -- and often loudly. I have seen many more problems with deviations in the manufacturing process. Most are caught in acceptance testing, but one can certainly run into problems with untestable items, like explosive bolts. However, there are some pretty good non-destructive inspection techniques that can help to assure that the bolts are good. Where you get into trouble is with notions like an AQL (acceptable quality level) that permits a certain number of defects in a lot and still allows acceptance of the lot. AQLs are common in munitions but not common at all with aerospace parts. Nothing fails by chance alone, it fails for a reason. Physics at a macroscopic level is deterministic. If you make a part the same way every time it will perform the same way every time. Variation in performance is traceable to variation in manufacturing. </p><p>I'm not sure what a "common" failure might be in this business. But in an earlier post in this thread I found reference to explosive bolt problems going back quite some time on Soyuz. Explosive bolts do not have a particularly good reputation in the industry, and in my opinion other options are often preferable. There are some pretty good and extremely reliable pyrotechic devices for separation of stages and such -- mild detonating fuses and the "super zip" system leap to mind, and shaped charges are often used if the shock can be tolerated. The shuttle has had explosive bolt failures. I recall a launch in the last few years (before Columbia) in which at least one of the explosive bolts that release the SRBs did not fire -- the SRBs left the pad anyway.</p> <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>