Still at NASA?

[spaceenthus]

I was shocked and dismayed to recently find out that none other than Linda Ham is still at NASA.<br /><br />How can NASA expect to have people believing that they are truly "changing their culture" as they term it when they allow someone who so blatently disregarded facts that had such catastrophic implications!<br /><br />I am truly disgusted. This woman should have been canned from the get-go not still be around sucking up my tax dollars as a civil servant!

 

[CalliArcale]

Personally, I think she's been unfairly demonized. It's convenient to have a single person to blame for an accident, but the reality is that it was no one person's fault. It was the *culture's* fault, and she was one of many people operating within that culture. She fell into the trap, same as hundreds of others in the chain of command. If she should be fired, so should almost everybody else there, and then you've lost all of your experience and are in an even worse situation than before.<br /><br />Have you read the book "Comm Check"? I highly recommend it. It goes into tremendous detail as to the real problems. And it wasn't the people. It wasn't even Linda Ham. She was not a bad person. She thought she was doing what was best for the Shuttle, and listening to the experts. She ignored nothing. Unfortunately, she failed to question a lot of things that she should've questioned, and that was a problem that permeated the organization. If they got the answers they wanted, they didn't question them. There was a definite bias towards favorable data. It wasn't just Linda Ham, and it certainly wasn't something she started; she developed into it along with everybody else.<br /><br />So firing her would solve nothing at all, because she wasn't the problem. The culture was the problem. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#666699"><em>"People assume that time is a strict progression of cause to effect, but actually from a non-linear, non-subjective viewpoint it's more like a big ball of wibbly wobbly . . . timey wimey . . . stuff."</em>  -- The Tenth Doctor, "Blink"</font></p> </div>

 

[spaceenthus]

The problem with many NASA managers and Linda Ham epitomizes this problem is that they are promoted by being promoted out of the way. <br /><br />Then to make matters worse they feel that they know best when what they should be doing is listening to the people who ACTUALLY know what is going on. The engineers or specialists with the knowledge are shut out by managers who haven't got adequate knowledge. This mentality is what happened with Apollo 1, then again with Challenger and then again with Columbia. The experets were NOT listened to in the case of Columbia. They were flat out overruled. The EXPERTS said that they should reposition satellites to look at the underside of the orbiter. <br /><br />Yep I've read Comm Check. Have you read the CAIB report? That's a much more accurate account.<br /><br />And I agree -- some major house cleaning should have been done after Columbia (as it should have after Challenger) to get rid of the people who are not doing their job. The job of the NASA team in Houston is to protect our crews. The phrase "ever vigilant" is used to describe MOD. If that phrase was true the 2 shuttle distasters would most likely not have happened. Anyone who does not embrace this thought of "ever vigilant" should be canned immediately. Linda Ham was the poster child (though not the only one to blame) for a MAJOR lack of vigilance and care for the crew. She is the one who the public associates with the diaster and what a grievous error for NASA to leave her in a position where outsiders can question NASA's true intentions. (NASA doesn't need any more nayers and doubters - we have plenty) Without making an example of what happens when you do act as one should NASA has condoned the behavior that occurred during that fateful mission. <br /><br /><br />Now all that said.... even had they listened to the experts it is highly debateable if they would even have been able to do anything to save the crew BUT at least the crew would have known what the situation was. We

 

[brellis]

Interesting discussion you two are having here. So many great threads here at SDC! I don't know the particulars of who is to blame for the failures of Columbia and Challenger, but I do recall clearly the point that NASA's 'cultural' flaws persisted between the two tragedies.<br /><br />Have the flaws in the 'culture' at NASA been corrected? One hopes so, since they're likely 2-for-2 in successful shuttle launches post-Columbia, but it's taken more than 3 years to get the ISS construction program back on track. 3 years for a bunch of cameras to be mounted on the booster rockets? If NASA were a publicly-offered company and we were the shareholders, there would be a lot of clamor about how long it was taking for not that much of a change in the program.<br /><br />NASA is a government agency populated by real, capable people; would they have done better if NASA were a private company competing for investment capital? A private company would take more risks, because in the private world, natural selection would theoretically steer the money to the most successful team. <br /><br />But what if failure dried up the flow of money entirely? NASA doesn't have to compete with other govt agencies for space exploration capital, although they do have to compete with the Dept of War. That said, they are guaranteed to have ongoing funding, but there is a 'culture' of success in public financing of space exploration. <br /><br />This situation is part of what has steered me to the position that NASA should outsource more of its manned mission programs to private enterprise, where risks can be taken without years of fallout. NASA is having great success with unmanned missions, and there are some great thinkers supported by NASA who are developing blueprints for new ideas like the space elevator, ion propulsion, etc. Let's have NASA share its R&D on manned space exploration with private enterprise, annd vice versa. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p><font size="2" color="#ff0000"><em><strong>I'm a recovering optimist - things could be better.</strong></em></font> </p> </div>

 

[pathfinder_01]

Ah, the trouble with the Columbia accident is that NASA allowed itself to get into a position where they had no data. It wasn’t Linda’s fault. It was the organizations fault. Yes it was a culture problem. <br /><br />Due to the camera being out of focus no one knew just exactly where did the foam hit and what damage (if any) did it do. The shuttle had been struck by foam over 100 times and made it back safely why should this one be different? <br /><br />Without some way to examine the heat shield barirng an extremely dangerous spacewalk they simply had no idea that the shuttle was in real danger and not much inclination to risk some poor guy’s life as well as the shuttle by hanging some guy down a ladder and out the cargo bay.<br /><br />Would you have called for launching a dangerous rescue mission with an expert telling you that in theory the damage should be minor and no idea of just how much damage is there?<br /><br />Would you have risked an astronaut’s life as well as the shuttle(and everyone aboard) to check out damage that you are not even sure is there and actually poses a risk?<br /><br />I am not sure I would. <br /><br />It is human nature to blame individuals, but in the long run it is useless unless you learn from their mistakes. The mistake of Columbia is not having a way to examine and fix the heat shield and forgetting that the shuttle is an experimental plane. <br /><br />One of the great fears I have about the CEV is that NASA may get lulled into a different type of compliancy. (i.e. capsules are safer than space planes). Time will tell<br />

 

[jamie_young]

What did she do wrong?

 

[hansolo0]

It is my understanding that upon realizing columbia had been struck by debris, nasa engineers asked to take satellite photos of columbia and Linda Ham basically said "No, it'd be a waste of time, we can't do anything to fix it if it has been damaged anyway" Which personally infuriates me if true. I mean hello? Apollo 13 anyone? The only thing I wouldn't fault her/them too much for was thinking columbia had any damage since shuttles had been hit by debris before and never had any significant damage. It'd never happend before. Still, they have to be careful and should have checked anyway. That' much I fault her for and definately think she should've been canned.<br />

 

[pathfinder_01]

The other problem is that every other time they used satellite photos they didn’t get any useful data. I also think that odds are the photos would not have answered the question as they would need to spot a small dark hole on a black background using a spy satellite that might or might not have the capability. In the photos that were released of discovery you couldn’t see individual tiles nor make out that the area the were interested in(the door holding the parachute used on landing) was open or closed.

 

[CalliArcale]

Actually, hansolo0, it would indeed have been impossible to fix the hole or rescue the crew. They were doomed to die before they even reached orbit. The Apollo 13 crew had the marvellous talents of those on the ground, but they were also extremely lucky. There was no damage to their heatshield (reentry was exceptionally tense for that flight, because the departing SM showed so much blast damage that there was a very real risk of a damaged heat shield). That was the one factor over which they had no control, and they won the gamble. But Columbia's heatshield had a hole in it. There was no way to fix it. There wasn't even a way to *find* it at the time.<br /><br />Yes, they should've checked anyway. They should have had the data. But I cannot blame Linda Ham for it. I blame the culture instead, because it was certainly not just her. It was the entire organization. They had it in their heads that nothing could go wrong, and so they were unconsciously biasing themselves against bad news. They had also fallen into the trap of thinking that since they'd launched over a hundred Shuttles without problems, there would be no problems this time either.<br /><br />I did indeed read the CAIB report, but I think Comm Check does such a wonderful job of putting human faces on it. It's easier to demonize someone when you don't know them, but it's not fair. Nor is it sensible. A lot of organizations with these sorts of problems do exactly what has been suggested at the top of this thread: they find a scapegoat and fire them, and then call the problem fixed. They pat themselves on the back and then go on about their business just as they always have. But since the real problem was their culture, the problem is still there. The scapegoat only behaved like that because the culture told them to, so their replacement will almost certainly end up in the same situation, no matter how good a person they are.<br /><br />I had the fantastic opportunity yesterday to hear a member o <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#666699"><em>"People assume that time is a strict progression of cause to effect, but actually from a non-linear, non-subjective viewpoint it's more like a big ball of wibbly wobbly . . . timey wimey . . . stuff."</em>  -- The Tenth Doctor, "Blink"</font></p> </div>

 

[hansolo0]

We'll never know for sure, will we? Had things worked out differently they could've tried a thousand different things to save the crew. However unlikely the satellites checking or a crew member on an eva could have checked for damage might have turned up anything. Look at it this way, if Ham gave the ok, she couldn't be blamed for anything, could she? She took any further options away from the columbia crew. Humans can acheive some amazing things when under pressure and lives are at stake. I even heard they might have made a spacewalk to another shuttle however risky or unlikely that might have been. They probably couldn't have done anything like that for apollo. So I reject the "they were doomed" scenario, nobody can possibly know for 100% certainty. We can agree to disagree. Also saying "it was the culture" may be true, but ultimately, it comes down to a decision by individuals. Culture or not, someone should be held responsible. By glossing it over and just saying that's the way it was at Nasa somehow cheapens things in my eyes. People need to know there are consequences for decisions like the ones that Ham apparently made, and letting her off the hook just means she's in a position to make more bad decisions, and the culture in some ways continues on.

 

[pathfinder_01]

Sadly sometimes the no win scenario exists, but you try you best not to get into one in the first place. This is probably the lesson of Columbia. Actually they did a study to determine if anything could have worked ala Apollo 13. <br /><br />There was nothing onboard the shuttle that could have been used to fix the hole. This is not surprising considering the fact that the damaged area is one of the hottest on the shuttle. You would need a material able to stand over 2,300 F for around 15 minutes. Further complicating the repair is that if the airflow over the patched area is disrupted it will generate even more heat (or cause nearby areas that are not as heat resistant to overheat). And that doesn’t even go into the problem of how to hold it in place. NASA attempted to use a couple of repair ideas after the disaster, and they did not withstand testing. <br /><br />They might have been able to launch Atlantis for rescue as the shuttle that was be used for the next mission if they had enough lead time. However later it was learned that Atlantis needed a repair, and could not have been launched. Which is why Discovery became the shuttle to do the return to flight. I am not sure at what state Discovery was in the process, but it was likely further behind Atlantis in processing. Endeavor was in no shape to launch as it was entering a major Orbiter modification period. <br /><br /> It was not NASA’s policy to keep a shuttle on hand for rescue at this point in time and most other missions up to this point would have had even less probability of rescue. Even then there would only have been a 5 day window between the maximum time Columbia could support a crew and the minimum amount of time Atlantis for Atlantis to be launched. <br /><br />The big problem with the rescue scenario is time. Management did not think that there was a serious problem until the crew was lost. Management did not think that the shuttle was at risk and so was not as inclined to take fast action to save i