Probably the biggest albatross around the Shuttle's neck, design-wise, is the "too many cooks" factor. In a noble but doubtless futile attempt to save money by merging requirements, the government decreed that the Shuttle should serve not just NASA but also the USAF (which immediately resulted in the Dynasoar cancellation) and other DoD interests. The latter would include the intelligence community, who otherwise had to work through the USAF.<br /><br />Unfortunately, these three groups did not always have the same objectives in mind, and so in trying to satisfy all their demands, the Shuttle design ended up being a host of compromises between conflicting requirements. One of the most immediate impacts was weight; the Shuttle is a lot heavier than the original USAF and NASA concepts for a winged spaceplane. This in turn led to scrapping the SSTO idea and reducing the percentage of reused components. It's one heck of a vehicle; it can do things no other vehicle has ever done, and will probably not be duplicated for a long while to come. But one does have to question whether it really *needed* to be able to do those things. In particular, its early use as a satellite launch vehicle has been pretty much superceded by the lowering costs of the expendable launch vehicle industry.<br /><br />Side-thought: I wonder if the failure of the Shuttle to meet its lofty goals (in particular, cheap access to space) was a harbinger of the telecommunications bubble of the 1990s? <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#666699"><em>"People assume that time is a strict progression of cause to effect, but actually from a non-linear, non-subjective viewpoint it's more like a big ball of wibbly wobbly . . . timey wimey . . . stuff."</em> -- The Tenth Doctor, "Blink"</font></p> </div>