Scaled Composites Accident

[holmec]

Whose stand point are you referring from? OSHA?<br /><br />After this experience if Scaled is worth their salt, there will be no more incidents like this.<br /><br />I was referring to operational changes withing the company as a result of the incident. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#0000ff"><em>"SCE to AUX" - John Aaron, curiosity pays off</em></font></p> </div>

 

[holmec]

<blockquote><font class="small">In reply to:</font><hr /><p>Pure private efforts do not have this kind of protection, and can be far more easily derailed!<br /><p><hr /></p></p></blockquote><br /><br />If worse comes to worse, then maybe Congress or the Executive branch needs to step in. This is a unique case, not one common in private industry in that this is the first time in history that private space companies have the chance to develop. So I'd be in favor of a NASA oversight as a way for OJT to avoid OSHA interference. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#0000ff"><em>"SCE to AUX" - John Aaron, curiosity pays off</em></font></p> </div>

 

[holmec]

Frodo is stating the harsh reality of Occupational Safety folks. But that's not the end of the road. If Scaled fails in selecting the correct procedures then were all screwed. I think Scaled may need help in developing an operational and safety 'culture' within the company. The main goverment organization that can do that in this area is NASA. Even to OSHA private space is new. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#0000ff"><em>"SCE to AUX" - John Aaron, curiosity pays off</em></font></p> </div>

 

[docm]

I'll have to search for the reference, but I recently read that the real cause of the accident was someone opening a pressure valve when they shouldn't have....probably the fill valve from the supply tank. <br /><br />IOW it was initially a pressure explosion, not an ignition...at least until the inevitable happened.<br /><br />In that case the only "cures" possible would be increased training and/or genetically engineering stupidity out of the human genome <img src="/images/icons/tongue.gif" /> <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[holmec]

<blockquote><font class="small">In reply to:</font><hr /><p>In that case the only "cures" possible would be increased training and/or genetically engineering stupidity out of the human genome <p><hr /></p></p></blockquote><br /><br />A good can of WHOOPASS! should do the trick. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> <p> </p><p><font color="#0000ff"><em>"SCE to AUX" - John Aaron, curiosity pays off</em></font></p> </div>

 

[Testing]

Not trying to change the subject here but it obviously needs explanation. How many who have posted here in this tread other than Frodo, SG and myself have documented propellant, oxidizer and deadly chemical handling experience? I posted this thread only as information. Not as a judgement. When you have put yourself in the situation and have the experience hands on and have all the facts you can make a judgement. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[docm]

Liquid O2, H2, NOx, N, He, Radium, 60Cobalt, Thorium and various other radioisotopes, caustic agents and explosives. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[Testing]

I hope the Dueterium system was properly decommisioned when we pulled it out. No other nukes. Add in Iodine, Chlorine, 70% Hydrogen Peroxide and Potasium Hydroxide. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[spacester]

A question if I may . . . after the set-up. <br /><br />First, my understanding of SC's safety culture, very briefly.<br /><br />Burt has always been proud of his safety record. He claimed zero deaths attributable to design errors. He also freely acknowledged, to the point of excess perhaps, that he does safety different than NASA. Different founding principles, different levels of bureaucracy, and lower operating costs as a result. This is one of the things he brings to the table as an innovator. SS1 pushed to the edge but not over it. Voyager as well. Lots of others, the man has been exposed to risk all his adult life. I understand some people have died in homebuilt airplanes of his design, but none were attributable to design error.<br /><br />Myself, I have a small amount of background in safety, but not aerospace. There are some basic common sense things I would suppose are part of the scheme in Aerospace safety. Programmed procedures, verification steps,etc. But if taken to excess, you no longer have any kind of entrepreneurial edge.<br /><br />E.g. thou shall not touch that valve until thus and so has happened, been witnessed and verified.<br /><br />At some basic level this is obviously essential. At some level way beyond that, the team can't get anything done because you spend all morning getting ready and all afternoon shutting down. So a happy medium is what you're looking for.<br /><br />In the experience of those here who are experienced, would you anticipate that such an accident could have happened anywhere, in the sense that if a human makes a horrible enough mistake, ka-boom will follow?<br /><br />IOW, are 'big aerospace' procedures written such that the fatal valve would never have been opened because it would have still had a lockout on it? Or are things not so tight as that, depending on training to have everyone stay away from that valve except under defined circumstances? <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[docm]

Well...dual valves in series could have helped, one at either end of the dispenser line. Then it takes two careless fools to cause a problem. <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>

 

[Testing]

I have to reserve my opinion until I see a definitive report. I am not qualified to judge an orginization run by Mr. Rutan Is anyone here qualified? <div class="Discussion_UserSignature"> </div>