The main problem with the composite liquid hydrogen tank was air diffusing into the cold but permiable material and freezing solid, then vaporizing (and expanding) as the tank warmed, forcing apart the laminations. The solution was not the metal tanks ordered as a "quick fix"; obviously the purpose of a technolgy demontration program is to solve problems like this properly. And solve it they did. After the X-33 cancellation, the X-33 contractors built a final composite tank test article that did very well (see Avweek) by applying a metal foil over the composite to seal it against gas intrusion.<br /><br />The VentureStar, as it was proposed, was unrealistic. Its mass fractions were unachievable and its financing required the contractor to invest billions with little hope of a return. But that had nothing to do with the real value of the X-33, which was as a technology demonstrator. The fundamental problem with the Shuttle was not the concept of reusability, but the lack of any flight experience with many of the critical systems, including the TPS and SRBs. This led to inaccurate predictions of cost and reliability because the failure modes and maintenance requirements were unknown, and design choices we later came to regret. <br /><br />The X-33, X-34, DC-X, and X-37 were an answer to this problem; a range of unmanned but reusable technology demonstrators that would provide the flight experience with a range of concepts needed for designing a shuttle successor that would finally make manned flight practical. Abandoning these programs when they were already producing new knowledge was incredibly shortsighted. We have eaten our seed corn. <br /><br />Maybe we can restart these programs by recognizing their value to the original NASA mission. That mission was largely forgotten, not when the Moon Race ended, but rather when it began. The original mission of NASA was not to plant flags and footprints on the Moon, but to advance the technology of flight. <br /><br />